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Case No. 8206 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CQ:UNTY WATER SYSTEM, INC., a corpora-
tion, ALMA H. COTTAM, MEEKS WIRTHLIN 
and ADRIAN WRIGHT, a partnership, doing 
business as Wright-Wirthlin Company, JOHN 0. 
SPECK, McDONALD BROS., INC., a corpora-
tion; JOSEPH McDONALD; and KEITH L. 
KNIGHT, doing business as Knight Realty 
Company, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-vs.-
SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal Corporation; 
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF 
SALT LAKE CITY, a body politic; the PUBLIC 
SERVICE COMMISSION. OF UTAH, a Commis-
sion of Utah; ALEXANDER BUILDING COR-
PORATION OF UTAH, a corporation; SHAW 
INC., a corporation; SOUTHEAST INC., a cor-
poration; SALT LAKE COUNTY CONSERV-
ANCY DISTRICT, a body politic; BERTHA 
SHEPHERD; BERNARD P. BROCKBANK, 
doing business as the Brockbank Realty and 
Construction Company; GEORGE H. SMEATH, 
MARY H. SMEATH, and J. K. THAYN, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND RESP·ONDENT 
SALT LAKE CITY 
Appealed from Third District Court of Salt Lake County, 
HON. CLARENCE E. BAKER, Judge 
.E. ··J{,. CHRISTENSEN, 
. ) _ City Attorney 
HOMER HOLMGREN and 
WAYNE CHRISTOFFERSEN 
Assistant City Attorneys 
. Attorneys for Defendant and Respondent 
S.alt Lake City 
414 City & County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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IN THE. SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY WATER SYSTEM, INC., a corpora-
tion, ALMA H. COTTAM, MEEKS WIRTHLIN 
and ADRIAN WRIGHT, a partnership, doing 
business as vVright-Wirthlin Company, JO·HN 0. 
SPECK, McDONALD BROS., INC., a corpora-
tion; JOSEPH McDONALD; and KEITH L. 
KNIGHT, doing business as Knight Realty 
Company, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-vs.-
SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal Corporation; 
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF 
SALT LAKE CITY, a body politic; the PUBLIC 
SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH, a Commis-
sion of Utah; ALEXANDER BUILDING COR-
PORATION OF UTAH, a corporation; SHAW 
INC., a corporation; SOUTHEAST INC., a cor-
poration; SALT LAKE COUNTY CONSERV-
ANCY DISTRICT, a body politic; BERTHA 
SHEPHERD; BERNARD P. BROCKBANK, 
doing business as the Brockbank Realty and 
Construction Company; GEORGE H. SMEATH, 
MARY I-I. SMEATH, and J. K. THAYN, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
8206 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND R.ESP·ONDENT 
SALT LAKE CITY 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The plaintiffs filed a petition in the lower court for 
a delaratory judgment. By their petition plaintiffs 
sought to have Salt Lake City declared a public utility 
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and subject to the Public Utilities Act in the sale and 
distribution of its surplus water to consumers outside 
its territorial limits, and particularly within the limits 
of an area as to which the plaintiff, County Water Sys-
tem, had secured a Certificate of Convenience and Neces-
sity from the Public Service Commission to distribute 
culinary water. The essential provisions of the petition 
are set out in plaintiffs' Brief so that an attempt on our 
part to state these provisions would be mere repetition. 
The defendant Salt Lake City, together with other of the 
defendants, filed a Motion to Dismiss based upon the 
ground that the petition did not state a claim which would 
entitle the plaintiffs to any relief. The matter was ar-
gued before the lower court, briefs were submitted and 
the Motion of the defendant was granted. 
We shall attempt to answer each of the points relied 
on by plaintiffs in their brief in the order in which they 
there app-ear. The points relied upon by defendant Salt 
Lake City constitute the reverse of the points made by 
the plaintiffs and are as follows: 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMrnSING 
THE PETITION HEREIN. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO 
CO·NSTRUE THE P'ROVISIONS OF U.C.A. 1953, 54-2-1, SUB-
DIVISIONS 3, 26 and 28, TO THE EFFECT THAT THE DE-
FENDANT, SALT LAKE CITY, IS WITHOUT AUTHORITY 
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TO SELL OR DELIVER ANY WATER WITHIN THE AR.EA 
DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE PETITION FILED 
HEREIN EXCEPT WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE DE-
FENDANT COMMISSION AND ONLY TO THE PLAINTIFF 
COUNTY WATER SYSTEM, INC., OR OTHER PUBLIC 
UTILITY. 
POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO 
FIND THAT THE DEFENDANT SALT LAKE CITY IS 
WITHOUT RIGHT OR AUTHORITY TO CONSTRUCT OR 
OPERATE A WATER SYSTEM FOR THE DELIVERY OF 
WATER TO RETAIL CONSUMERS OUTSIDE OF ITS COR-
PORATE LIMITS OR TO REGULATE OR CONTROL THE 
DISTRIBUTION O·F WATER THROUGH SUCH SYSTEM. 
POINT FOUR 
THE TRIAL CO·URT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO 
FIND THAT THE DEFENDANT PUBLIC SERVICE COM-
MISSION OF UTAH HAS AUTHORITY AND THAT IT IS 
ITS DUTY TO REGULATE THE SALE AND DISTRIBUTION 
OF WATER WHICH IS DISPOSED OF BY THE DEFEND-




THE TRIAL COURT DID NO·T ERR IN DISMISSING 
THE PETITION HEREIN. 
It seems. to be the plaintiff's position, under their 
F'irst Point that notwithstanding it appears as a matter 
' 
of law that Salt Lake City, in the disposition of its sur-
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4 
plus water, is not subject to the control of the Public 
Service c·ornmission, the court nevertheless, should not 
have dismissed the action, but should have gone on 
through the process of a trial even though no different 
result would or could be reached. In effect their argu-
ment is that a Motion to Dismiss can never be invoked in 
an action for declaratory relief. Further, it appears to be 
their contention that a dismissal is not proper even as to 
parties against whom no relief is asked and as to whon1 
no cause of action is stated. They argue, by analogy to 
quiet title actions, that the only way such defendants 
could be relieved from the action is by filing a dis-
claimer, and then they would, nevertheless, be bound by 
the judgment that might be entered. 
While plaintiffs' position as to the defendants 
against who1n no relief is asked, and as to whom no cause 
of action is stated, may not affect defendant Salt Lake 
City in this ap·peal, we deem it advisable, nonetheless, 
to point out that th.ere is no analogy between a quiet title 
action and the present action. First of all, in a quiet title 
action a cause of action must be alleged. Plaintiff may 
not allege merely that <Iefendants claim some ownership 
or right in the property in question, but must allege own-
ership and a right of possession in himself as against all 
named defendants. He cannot merely allege that defend-
ants claim an interest in the property involved and by 
that 1neager p-rocess deny the defendants the right to 
have the action dismissed for want of stating a cause of 
action or comp.el them to eome in and file a disclaimer. 
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In the quiet title action, the plaintiff must show that he 
is entitled to relief as against the defendants by a proper 
allegation of ownership in himself. In the absence of 
such allegations, his complaint has no efficacy as against 
a motion to dismiss. Likewise in this case where there 
can be no control as a. matter of law by the Public Service 
Co1nmission over the disposition of the City's surplus 
"\Vater, as the trial court must have held, there is nothing 
to sustain the action against any of the defendants. 
vVhether the trial court erred in so holding is another 
1natter which vvill he discussed later in this brief. 
It is conceded by plaintiffs that .an action for a de-
claratory judgrnent is subject to the same procedural 
rules and principles as those applicable to civil cases gen-
erally. Section 78-38-9, U.C.A., 1953, provides that: 
"vVhen a proceeding under this chapter in-
volves the determination of an issue of fact, such 
issue may be tried and deterrnined in the same 
manner as issues of fact are tried and determined 
in other civil actions in the court in which the 
proceeding is pending." 
Obviously, if only questions of law are involved, since 
by Motion to Dismiss the essential facts are admitted, 
the matter is to be disposed of in the same manner as 
other civil actions generally. So far as ·Salt Lake City is 
concerned, our theory, in making the Motion to Dismiss, 
is that, admitting the facts to be as stated in the peti-
tion, the court could only declare that under the consti-
tutional and statutory provision, and under the law an-
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nounced by the court, the defendant City has the power 
to sell water outside its territorial limits and that in 
doing so it is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Public 
Service Commission. If that theory is correct then that 
would end the matter and any further hearings or pro-
ceedings would be useless. The trial court evi:dently 
agreed with the City's theor.y and so properly dismissed 
the petition. 
Having disn1issed as to the City, there 'vas no issue 
left to be tried as to the other defendants, assuming 
they had an interest in the subject matter of the action. 
There would be no rights to declare as between plain-
tiffs and the defen:dants or either of them. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NO·T ERR IN FAILING TO 
CO·NSTRUE THE PRO·VISIONS OF U.C.A. 1953, 54-2-1, SUB-
DIVISIONS 3, 26 and 28, TO THE EFFECT THAT THE DE-
FENDANT, SALT LAKE CITY, IS WITHOUT AUTHORITY 
TO SELL OR DELIVER ANY WATER WITHIN THE AREA 
DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE PETITION FILED 
HEREIN EXCEPT WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE DE-
FENDANT CO·MMISSION AND O·NLY TO THE PLAINTIFF 
CO·UNTY WATER SYSTEM, INC., OR OTHER PUBLIC 
UTILITY. 
The question as to the right of the City to dispose 
of its surplus water outside its territorial limits without 
being subject to control by the Public Service Conunission 
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will be discussed in another part of this brief. Under this 
heading we wish to point out that this court is commit.ted 
to the following propositions : 
(a) The City is not a public utility under the pro-
visions of the Public Utili ties Act. 
(b) The City, in the absence of statute, has the 
right to dispose of its surplus water outside 
its territorial limits. 
(a) Logan City v. Public Util~ties Com-
m~ission, 72 Ut. 536, 271 P. 961. 
This case involved the right of the Public Utility Com-
mission to fix the rates to be charged by Logan City in 
furnishing electricity from its municipally owned and 
operated electric power plants. The city solicited custo-
Iners in competition with the Utah Power & Light Com-
pany and the commission ordered the city to charge the 
same rates charged by the Power & Light Company and 
annulled all contracts as to rates between the City and 
its customers. 
Two members of the Supreme Court held that re-
gardless of the definitions of public utility contained 
in the statute a power plant owned and operated by the 
city "was not intended to be a public utility within the 
meaning of the utilities act, giving the commission super-
vision, direction and control over such municipal corpo-
rate affairs and functions." 
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Two members held the utilities act if -construed to 
include a municipally owned and operated plant as a pub-
lic utility subject to control and regulation by the Utility 
Commission it would be unconstitutional under the pro-
vision of Sec. 29, Art. 6 of Utah Constitution. "We think 
it clear that the undoubted p~urpose of the constitutional 
provision is to hold inviolate the right of local self-
government of cities and towns with respect to municipal 
improvements, money, p·roperty, effects, the levying of 
taxes, and the performance of municipal functions." 
State Tax Commission v. Cvty of Logan, SS 
Ut. 406, 54 P. 2d 1197. 
The case of Logan City v. Public Utility Com.mission, 
supra, was referred to to the effect that the Public Utility 
Com. was without jurisdiction to fix rates to be charged 
for electricity generated by a municipally owned and 
operated power plant. 
In Lehi v. Barnes, 74 Ut. 321, 279 P. 878, the court 
held the city did not need a certificate of convenience 
and necessity to enlarge its business and selling electrical 
energy to its inhabitants. 
Utah Pow~er & Light Co. v. Pu-blic Servvce Commis-
s~on, __ U t. ------, 249 P. 2d 951. The Public Service Com-
mission had or:dered the plaintiff to sell at wholesale elec-
tric energy to Nephi City, 'vhich in turn sold it to its 
inhabitants, where plaintiff company held itself out as 
giving such service to municipalities and where, by serv-
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ing Nephi, it would not be required to make any expendi-
tures it would not have to 1nake for any customer en-
titled to its services. The court sustained the order. It 
says: 
"In accordance with. the holding of this court 
in Logan City v. Public Utilities Commission, 72 
Ut. 536, 271 P. 961, the Commission found that 
public utilities operated by municipalities are not 
subject to supervision and regulation by the Pub-
lic Utilities Commission." 
Childs v. Columbia, 87 S.C. 566, 70 S.E. 296, 34 
L.R.A.N.S. 542. The court held the authority granted to 
a 1nunicipal corporation to operate a water works system 
does not impose upon it the duty of a public service cor-
poration with respect to non residents to whom it eon-
tracts to furnish water. It can fix such rates as the City 
council deems to the best interest of the city. 
The foregoing Utah cases all involved distributing 
and selling electrical energy. The only statutory enact-
ment empowering cities to engage in such undertaking 
is Section 10-8-14, U.C.A. 1953. As to the matter of the 
city engaging in obtaining, regulating and controlling a 
vvater supply for its inhabitants, the Legislature has 
granted extensive and additional povvers to those con-
tained in Section 10-8-14. We think it important that 
these statutes be considered in the determination of the 
question whether a City is subject to the Public Service 
Commission in operating and maintaining a water system 
whether the water is sold vvithin or without its territorial 
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limits. They show the legislative intent to leave "invio-
late right of local self-government of cities and towns 
with respect to municipal improvements, money, prop-
erty, effects, the levying of taxes, and the performance 
of municipal funetions." This is especially true as to 
water, as the statutes, by their express language, grant 
to the cities extensive and detailed powers with respect 
thereto. The Legislature has given to the city such full, 
absolute and exclusive control of its water, waterworks 
and the distribution of its water, and over the regulations 
and rates which will govern its water service such that 
regulation in anyway by any other body or commission 
is absolutely negatived. The effect of such statutes must 
be to withhold jurisdiction from the Public Service Com-
mission as effectively as if the Public Utilities Act con-
tained an express exemption, especially so when most 
of said sections were enacted at the same session as the 
Public Utilities Act. Section 10-8-14 must be construed 
and considered in the light of such exclusive control. 
The power there given is a necessary concomitant of the 
power to own water rights and op,erate a waterworks 
system, for no City could exist and grow if it did not pro ... 
vide for its future needs and have water available in ex-
cess of its actual present needs. We assert, therefore, 
that ail of the sections above referred must be considered 
and are involved in the disposition of the matter before 
the court. F!or the convenience of the court ·\Ve quote 
these statutes: 
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Sec. 10-7-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 : 
"Limitations on right to acquire a.nd disp:ose 
of. - It shall not be lawful for any city or town 
to lease or purchase any part of such waterworks 
less than the whole, or to lease the same, unless 
the contract therefor shall provide that the city 
or town shall have control thereof and that the 
net revenues therefrom shall be divided propor-
tionately to the interests of the parties thereto ; 
said contract shall also provide a list of water 
rates to be enforced during the term of such con-
tract." 
Sec. 10-7-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953: 
"Water rates - Owner of prem.ises liable. -
No city or town which is the owner or in control 
of a system for furnishing water to its inhabitants 
shall be required to furnish water for use in any 
house, tenement, apartment, building, place, pre-
mises or lot, whether such water is for the use of 
the owner or tenant, unless the application for 
water shall be made in writing, signed by such 
owner or his duly authorized agent, in which ap-
plication such owner shall agree that he will pay 
for all water furnished such house, tenement, 
apartment, building, place, premises or lot accord-
ing to the ordinances, rules and regulations en-
acted or adopted by such city or town. In case an 
application for furnishing water shall be made by 
a tenant of the owner, such city or town may re-
quire as a condition of granting the same that 
such application contain an agreement signed by 
the owner thereof, or his duly authorized agent, 
to the effect that in consideration of the granting 
of such application the owner will pay for all 
water furnished such tenant, or any other occu-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
p,ant of the placed named in the application, in 
case such tenant or occupant shall fail to pay for 
the same according to the ordinances, rules and 
regulations enacted or adopted by such city or 
town." 
Sec. 10-7-11. 
"Failure to pay for service- Termination. In 
case the owner of any of the premises mentioned 
in section 10-7-10, or the tenant or occupant, shall 
fail to pay for water furnished such owner, tenant 
or occupant, according to such ordinances, rules 
or regulations enacted or adopted, the city or 
town may cause the water to be shut off from such 
premises, and shall not be required to turn the 
same on again until all arrears for water fur-
nished shall be paid in full." 
Sec. 10-7-12. 
"Scarcity of water - Limitation on use. -
In the event of scarcity of water the mayor of any 
city or the president of the board of trustees of 
any town may, by proclamation, limit the use of 
water for any purpose other than don1estic pur-
poses to such extent as may be required for the 
public good in the judgment of the board of com-
missioners or city council of any city or the board 
of trustees of any town." 
Sec. 10-7-14. 
"Rules and regulations for use of water. -
Every city and town may enact ordinances, rules 
and regulations for the 1nanage1nent and conduct 
of the waterworks system owned or controlled by 
0 t " 1 0 
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Sec. 10-8-2. 
"Appropr·iations - Acquisition and d.isposal 
of property. They may appropriate money for 
corporate purposes only, and provide for payment 
of debts and expenses of the corporation; 1nay 
purchase, receive, hold, s'ell, lease, convey and dis-
pose of property, real and personal, for the bene-
fit of the city, both within and without its corpo-
rate boundaries, improve and protect such prop-
erty, and may do all other things in relation there-
to as natural persons; provided, that it shall be 
deemed a corporate purpose to appropriate money 
for any purpose "\vhich in the judgment of the 
board of commissioners or city council will pro-
vide for the safety, preserve the health, promote 
the prosperity and improve the morals, peace, 
order, comfort and convenience of the inhabitants 
of the city. "' 
Sec. 10-8-14. 
"Water, light, telephone, street ra.ilways -
Providing service beyond limits of city. - They 
may construct, maintain and operate waterworks, 
gas works, electric light works, telephone lines or 
street railways, or authorize the construction, 
maintenance and operation of the same by others, 
or purchase or lease such works from any person 
or corporation, and they may sell and deliver the 
surplus product or service of any such work, not 
required by the city or its inh-abitants, to others 
beyond the li1nits of the city." 
s.ec. 10-8-22. 
"Water ra.tes. - They may fix the rates to 
be paid for the use of water furnished by the 
city." 
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It is well to point out that Sections 10-7-10 to 10-7-14, 
inclusive, were enacted in Chapter 17, 1917 Session Laws 
and became effective May 8, 1917. The Public Utility Act 
was first enacted at the same session in Chapter 47 Laws 
of Utah 1917 and became effective by its terms ('Section 
35 of Art. V thereof) upon approval of the governor, 
which occurred March 8, 1917. 
In addition to the foregoing statutes and to Sec. 29, 
Art. VI of the Utah Constitution quoted and construed 
in Logan City v. Public Utilitttes Commission, supra, we 
wish to call attention to Section 6, Art. XI of the· Utah 
Constitution which reads : 
"M 'UIJ'l.icipalrities forbidden to sell waterworks 
or rights. No municipal corporation, shall direct-
ly or indirectly, lease, sell, alien or dispose of 
any waterworks, water rights, or sources of water 
supply now, or hereafter to be owned or controlled 
hy it; but all such waterworks, water rights and 
sources of water supply now owned or hereafter 
to be acquired by any municipal corporation, shall 
be preserved, maintained and operated by it for 
supplying its inhabitants with water at reason-
able charges : Provided, that nothing herein con-
tained shall be construed to prevent any such 
municipal corporation from exchanging water-
rights, or sources of water supply, for other water-
rights or sources of water supply of equal value, 
and to be devoted in like manner to the public 
supply of its inhabitants." 
We think this constitutional provision is applicable here 
to further demonstrate that a city's water rights and 
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waterworks are inviolate from any intrusion thereon by 
any commission which would attempt to regulate and 
distribute any water belonging to the city, whether used 
by the inhabitants or disposed of as surplus outside 
the city li1ni ts as we shall point out further on in our 
brief. This constitutional provision was applied in Hyde 
Park v. Chambers, 99 Ut. 118, 104 P.2d 220, where the 
court held void a contract whereby the city gave a per-
petual right to use water from a tap outside the city 
limits in consideration of a right-of-way for its pipeline. 
The court there made this significant statement: 
"As to whether or not they (Chambers et a1) 
may purchase surplus water from the town to 
be used out of the tap is, of course, a m.atter of 
contract and a malter for the determina.tion of 
the town officials. If they have surplus water 
they may sell it within legal bounds. (Section 15-
8-14 R.S.U. 1933 and Annotations thereunder.)" 
(b) As shown by the text referred to by plaintiffs 
in 38 A.M. J'ur. Sec. 570, P. 258, there is a division of 
authority as to whether a city may, in the absence of 
statutory authority, sell its surplus water or other serv-
ices beyond its limits. The text says: 
"There is a tendency, particularly in the later 
cases, to take a more liberal view of municipal 
powers, at least as to the surplus product of public 
utilities plants and to allow extension of service 
lines to~ points outside the municipal limits si~ce 
a municipal corporation may lawfully engage in 
the business of disposing of a surplus necessarily 
acquired through the operation of a legitimate 
public enterprise." 
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This subject is annotated in 98 A.L.R. 1002 and Muir v. 
Murray City, 55 Ut. 368, 186 P. 433 is cited as holding to 
this view. 
That ease invoJved a 1914 contract to deliver electric 
energy to p·ersons along a power line constructed by 
Murray City seven miles outside its limits. There was 
then no statute authorizing sale of electric energy outside 
the city limits as that authorization did not come until 
Chapter 100, Laws of 1915, was enacted the following 
year. There was only a general provision authorizing 
a city to establish and operate an electrical p·ower plant 
for its inhabitants. The court says: 
"In constructing its works and obtaining its 
power, it was its (city's) duty to pay due regard 
to the future, and provide for the probable neces-
sities of a rapidly increasing population. In such 
case it could not but happen, as it did happen in 
the present case, that when the works were com-
pleted and put into operation the city found it 
had a large surplus of power over and above all 
present demands, or probable demands for many 
years to come. In these circumstances what did 
plaintiff do~ It sought for customers to take its 
surplus. It was unable to find a sufficient number. 
It concluded to extend the line on to Granite, 
which afforded a paying market for a small por-
tion of its surplus. This the city did, and in doing 
so, found it necessary to borrow the money and 
create the indebtedness which constitutes the sub-
ject-matter of the present action. The investment 
proved to be a profitable one, and while, as be-
fore stated, cities are not organized primarily as 
profit making concerns, yet when it is. incidental, 
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as in the instant case, to a proper exercise of its 
legitimate powers, the making of the enterprise 
a profitable one was highly -commendable. This 
view is sustained by many well considered cases 
which have been called to our attention. City of 
Henderson v. Young, 119 Ky. 224, 83 S.W. 583, is 
exactly in point. The third paragraph of the sy-
llabi reads as follows : 
" 'Ky. St. 1903, Section 3290, subsec. 5, author-
izing cities of the third class to provide 'the city 
and the inhabitants thereof' with light, etc., does 
not prohibit the city from extending its electric 
light service to points without the eity limits, 
where it can do so with very little additional ex-
pense, and in such a way as to result in ad-
vantage to the city and its inhabitants.' Other 
cases are cited, including Milligan v. Miles City 
51 ~!ont. 37 4, 153 P. 276, L.R.A. 1916 C, 395; Colo. 
Springs v. Colo. City, 42 Colo. 75, 94 P. 316." 
The following cases from Arizona and Colorado fol-
low the same reasoning. 
City of Tucson v. Sims, 39 Ariz. 168, 4 P. 
2d 673. 
The City entered into a contract to supply water to a sub-
division outside its boundaries under the same regula-
tions, and at sa1ne charges it supplied its inhabitants. 
The city extended a main to its boundary and the water 
systern of the subdivision was there connected. The 
agreement provided the city should take over and eontrol 
and manage the distribution system at the time water 
was turned into it and was to belong to the city thereafter. 
After several years the city increased rates for this out-
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side delivery 50% above city rates. The land owners 
brought suit for refund. The court first held this in-
crease violated the contract. The city contended it had 
no power to sell outside its limits. The court refers to a 
statute which empowers city "to construct wells, sys-
tems, aqueducts and conduits to supply the city with 
water or to purchase said sup·ply," and the Constitution 
which empowers cities to engage in any business enter-
prise which any person, firm or corporation could en-
gage in by virtue of a franchise from the city. Neither 
of these provisions exp.ressly prohibit the city from sup-
plying water outside its boundaries and it is immaterial 
that there is no specific po,ver granting the power to do 
so as in sup·plying water it is engaged in a proprietary 
enterprise and in so doing it has "the same rights and 
is subject to the same liabilities as private corporations 
or individuals." 
"Before it could furnish its own residents 
with water it was necessary that it secure from 
some source a sup·ply sufficient in quantity for 
this purpose and that it install a system for dis-
tributing it. The record, it is true, contains a 
stipulation that during the p·eriod covered by the 
contract the city did not have a surplus storage 
capacity, but this is unimportant in view of the 
fact that it did supply the residents of Memlo 
Park with water for 11 or 12 years before increas-
ing the rates, something it could not have done 
unless it had had at its source of supply n1ore 
water than it needed for its citizens. And it must 
likewise be true that its distributing system was 
built to meet the nee·ds of a growing population 
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and was, therefore, at that time capable of carry-
ing water to a greater nun1ber of people than lived 
within its boundaries ... Since the city, as a re-
sult of placing itself in a position to serve its own 
users found itself in ovvnership and control of a 
surplus dornestic "\Vater which could with little if 
any additional cost be supplied to those outside 
its lirnits and its income thereby increased, and 
since no provision of its charter or of the statute 
stood in the way of its doing so, its decision to fol-
low the dictates of common business prudence was 
clearly \vithin its po,ver." 
Board of Conlmissioners v. City of Ft. Collins, 68 
Colo. 364, 189 P. 929. The county comn1issioners peti-
tioned the city to lay a water n1ain from the present 
ter1ninus of the the city's main on Garfield Street to 
carry "\Vater to the County poor farn1 and to persons who 
1night later vvant to connect therewith and be added to 
the city. It \vas proposed that when the water rents pro-
duced an arnount per annum equal to 20% of the cost of 
the 1nain the city should take over the main and refund 
the cost of construcing it. This action was for the refund. 
~rhe cit~\~ claimed it had no power to enter into the pro-
posal U8 it \Vas ultra vires. r~l_lhe court quotes from 19 
R.C.L. 788, Sec.95: 
" 'When ... as a necessary result of carrying 
on a legitirnat(' public enterprise in a reasonably 
prudent manner a surplus of the rnateria.l used 
or distributed is acquired, or a by-product created, 
a rnunicipal corporation rnay lawfully engage in 
the business of disposing of such surplus or by-
product for profit without special legislative au-
thority.' " 
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The court cites a Colorado case, Milligan v. Miles 
City: 
" 'If it has a present surplus of water ... the 
dictates of common business prudence require that 
such surplus be sold, and the proceeds devoted to 
public use.'" 
It then says: 
"A surplus product like water or light, may, 
of course, be sold to consumers without the city, 
and, if so, mains or conduits may be laid to points 
without the City in order to convey the surplus 
produce 'where there is demand for its use.' The 
laying of the mains and the furnishing of the 
water are both a part of the same business enter-
prise. There is no rule that limits the disposal of 
surplus products only to cases where it may be 
done without any expense whatever. 
"It seems clear, therefore, that a city may in-
cur a reasonable expense as an incident to the sale 
of surplus water or other product to consumers 
without th·e corporate limits, and there is no rea-
son why such expense may not be incurred as the 
result of taking over or acquiring a water main 
running beyond its corporate limits." 
The foregoing cases are authority for the proposition 
that the city not only has the power to sell its surplus 
water outside its limits, but it also has power to build 
the necessary facilities to deliver such surplus water 
to the users oustide its limits, and it is a legitimate func-
tion of a city to so manage its affairs as to create a sub-
stantial surplus to be disposed of outside its limits. 
The additional question as to whether, in the disposition 
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of its surplus water, the city would be subject to the 
Public Service Commission is, of course, not determined 
by these authorities, but will be presented in the next 
part of this brief. 
POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO 
FIND THAT THE DEFENDANT SALT LAKE CITY IS 
WITHOUT RIGHT OR AUTHORITY TO CONSTRUCT OR 
OPERATE A WATER SYSTEM FOR THE DELIVERY OF 
vVATER TO RETAIL CONSUMERS OUTSIDE OF ITS COR-
PORATE LIMITS OR TO REGULATE OR CONTROL THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF WATER THROUGH SUCH SYSTEM. 
Plaintiffs concede that under the case of Logan City 
v. Public Util. Com., supra, the Public Service Commis-
sion has no jurisdiction over the sale and delivery of 
water within the city. In their brief in the lower court 
they said that this was so because "granting to the Pub-
lice Service Commission jurisdiction over matters relat-
ing to questions of purely local self-government was in-
hibitive by constitutional provisions there discussed." 
Plaintiffs seem to contend that the disposition by a. City 
of its surplus water would not be a matter of purely 
local self-government. That would be something over 
which the City is ousted of jurisdiction and jurisdiction 
is, therefore, vested in the Public Service Com1nission. 
To state the proposition, in the face of the statutory pro-
visions above quoted giving to cities the sole and exclu-
sive jurisdiction over their water and waterworks, and 
in the face of Section 29, Art. VI of the Utah Constitu-
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tion, which provides, that the "Legislature shall not dele 
gate to any special commission, private corporation or 
association, any power to make, supervise or interfere 
with any Inunicipal improvement, money, property or 
effects, whether held in trust or otherwise-or to per-
fori? any municipal function," is to sho'v its utter fallacy. 
Is not the surplus water owned by the city its prop-
erty and effects~ Are not the 'vater pipes that it by 
lavv has a right to install to deliver its surplus water 
its property and effect~ To give the Public Service Conl-
Inission jurisdiction over the disposition of this surplus 
water would be in direct opposition to the above constitu-
tional provision p-rohibiting intereference ,vith or super-
vision over municipal property and effects by such conl-
mission. To rule as plaintiffs contend would necessarily 
mean that the Public Service Commission would have 
an interest in and jurisdiction over all water rights, and 
all distribution systems acquired by the city, for in no 
other way could it assume to regulate and control the 
disposition of surplus water, for ultimately it would have 
to decide· what quantity of water was to be classified 
as surplus water and \vhat distribution should be made 
. of it. Certainly such a situation 'vould be in direct con-
flict with both the statutes and the constitution. Further-
more, if surplus water is held to be under the jurisdiction 
of the Public S.ervice Commission then those supplied 
therefrom would obtain a vested interest therein; they 
could demand water as a matter of right, all contrur~,­
to the provisions of Section 6, Art. XI, of the lTtah Con-
stitution which provides that "no Inunicipal,corporation 
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shall directly or indirectly lease, sell, alien or dispose of 
any water works or water rights or sources of water sup-
ply," but must hold them for the benefit of its inhabitants. 
Assuming the Public Service Coinmission has juris-
diction over the disposition of surplus water, how would 
it protect the users of surplus water~ Would it determine 
'-vhat is surplus~ Would it require the city to furnish 
water to all who desire vvater ~ Would it fix the rates~ 
Would it require a continuance of service when the city 
required the water for its inhabitants~ How could the 
Con1mission supervise the disposition of surplus water 
without supervising the entire supply and distribution 
\vithin the city~ It must be clear that the only basis upon 
which the city can dispose of its surplus water outside 
its territorial limits is by vvay of contract with such 
water users as it may desire to enter into contractual re-
lations with and only upon the basis that surplus water 
is involved. 
Surely it cannot be held that all of the statutes here-
inbefore quoted, relating to the power of cities over their 
water and waterworks, fixing of rates, etc., are to be 
li1nited in their application to water delivered to inhabi-
tants only and as to the disposition of surplus water they 
haYe no application and rnust be entirely disregarded; 
this in the face of an express power granted the city to 
sell its surplus water outside its limits. The language of 
these statut/es import no such narrow construction. The 
language is general, without any limitations or condi-
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tions, and applies equally to water service within. or with-
out the corporate limits. It must follow that Section 10-
8-22, authorizing the city to fix rates to be paid for the 
use of water furnished by the city, must apply to surplus 
water delivered outside the city as well as to water de-
livered within the city. 
Much of plaintiffs' brief on the point now under 
discussion is devoted to an attempt to show that the au-
thorities relied on by the city before the court below 
are not in point or do not sustain the city's position. We 
shall refer to and quote from these authorities here and 
later make son1e comment on plaintiffs' attempt to dis-
credit their being authority in the present action. 
Water Works Board v. City of Mobile, 43 
So. 2d 409. 
The Water Works Board was a corporation organ-
ized under statute with power to r~aise funds for the con-
struction of a water works plant by issuing revenue 
bonds. The City of Mobile brought an action for a de-
claratory judgment to test the power of the water board. 
A taxpayer of ~fobile was permitted to intervene. The 
court says: 
"In Atkinson v. City of Gadsden, 238 Ala. 556, 
192 So. 152, we held that a water works board 
has the auth.ority to supply 'vater not only to in-
habitants of a municipality, but to the surrounding 
territory. It follows that the Board has authority 
to issue revenue bonds, the p~roceeds of which will 
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be used ultimately to furnish water to users in 
the surrounding territory as well as to users with-
in the municipality. 
"The board may legally publish rates for the 
sale of water and may enter into contracts with 
the users of water without obtaining the approval 
of the Alabama Public Service Commission of 
such rates or contract." 
Atlantic Canst. Co. v. City of Raleigh, 53 'S.E. 2d 165; 
230 N.C. 365. The city made a charge of $100 per con-
nection to its sewer system outside its limits. Under con-
tract with Bashford it agreed to furnish water to the 
subdivision outside the city limits, the mains to be con-
structed by Bashford but in accordance with the city 
regulations, City to have supervision and control over 
mains, laterals, etc., to read meters, to turn water on and 
off and to collect water rents as its own, being same as 
paid by other outside water users. Plaintiff objected 
to the $100 fee having purchased 45 buiding lots in the 
subdivision. Plaintiff contended that since no charge or 
fee is required of owners within the city, the owners 
outside the city could not be charged and that the fee 
charged was unreasonable. The court says: 
"Obviously the municipality is not authorized 
by the statute, to compel owners of improved prop-
erty located outside the city, but which may be 
located upon or near one of its sewer lines or a 
line which empties into the city's sewerage system, 
to connect with the sewer line. But since it is op-
tional with a city as to whether or not it will fur-
nish water to residents outside its corporate limits 
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and pern1it such residents to connect their sewer 
facilities with the sewerage systen1 of the city, 
or with any other sewerage system which connects 
\Vith the city syste1n, it may fix the terms upon 
\Vhich the service may be rendered and its facili-
ties used. G.S. Sec. 160-255; G.S. 160-256; Ken-
nerly v. Town of Dallas, 215 N.C. 532, 2 S.E. 2d 
538; Williamson v. City of High Point, 213 N.C. 
96, 195 S.E. 90; George v. City of Ashville, 4 Cir., 
80 F. 2d 50, 103 A.L.R. 568. 
"The North Carolina Utilities Commission 
has no jurisdiction to fix or supervise the fees and 
charges to be made by a 1nunicipality for connec-
tions \vith a city sewerage systein, either within 
or without its corporate limits. G.S. Sec. 62-30 
(5); G.S. Sec. 62-122 (3). Therefore, a city is free 
to establish by contract or by ordinance such fees 
and charges for services rendered to residents out-
side its corporate lin1its. as it n1ay deem reasonable 
and pToper. G.'S. Sec. 160-240; G.S. Sec. 160-249; 
G.S. Sec. 160-284. 
"The status of a municipal corporation that 
extends the services of its public utilities beyond 
its corporate limits, is quite different from that 
of a public service corporation which holds a fran-
chise from the State and whose rates are fixed 
by the North Carolina Utilities Commission, G.S. 
Sec. 62-67. 
"The relationship existing between the plain-
tiff and the defendant is contractual, 'vhether it is 
based on the Bashford contract or the ordinances 
and the rules and regulations adopted by the gov-
erning board of the City of R.aleigh. The (lrfe:-:'1 · 
ant has no legal right to compel residents living 
outside its corporate li1nits to avail themselYes 
of the services which 1nay be offered by its public 
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utilities. On the other hand, in the absence of a 
contract providing otherwise, such residents are 
not in position to compel the city to make such 
services available to them. Childs v. City of 
Columbia 87 S.C. 566, 70 S.E. 296, 34 L.R.A.N.S .. , 
542; Board of Sup'vrs of Henrico County v. City 
of Richmond, 162 V a. 14, 172 S.E. 356; City of 
Phoenix v. Kasu1n, 54 .£_<\riz. 470, 97 P. 2d 210." 
Fillghunt v. Tow·n of Selrna, 76 S.E. 2d 368, N.C. The 
court says: 
"1-\.. 1nunicipality \vhich operates its own 
\Vater works is under no duty in the first instance 
to furnish water to persons outside its limits. It 
has the discretionary po,ver, however, to engage 
in this undertaking. G.S. Sec. 160-255 . 
.. \Vhen a municipality exercises this discre-
tionary power it does not assun1e the obligations 
of a I)ublic Service Corporation toward non resi-
dent consumers. G.S. Sec. 62-30 (3), 67 C.J. 
\\T aters, Sec. 739. It retains the authority to speci-
fy the tern1s upon 'vhich non residents 1nay obtain 
its \Vater. Atlantic Co. v. City of Raleigh, 230 N.C. 
3G5, 53 s .. E. 2d 165." 
Tozcn of Grin~csland v. City of Washington, 66 S.E. 
2d 79-!-. In 1924 plaintiff city constructed power trans-
rnission lines from defendant city's power plant. These 
lines passed through Chocowinty, an unincorporated vil-
lage. Plaintiff purchased power frou1 defendant for dis-
tribution to its inhabitants and sold the power to resi-
dents of Chocowint_y. This continued until1949 when the 
contract \Vith defendant city \Va~ terrninated. Plaintiff 
then purchased po\ver fro1n the City of Greenville and 
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furnished power to its san1e customers. Defendant city 
then built a parallel po"\ver line and began serving plain-
tiff's village customers. Plaintiff sought to enjoin de-
fendant from distributing electric power in the area 
served by plaintiff. The court. says: 
"The right of the Town of Grimesland to con-
struct and maintain an electric system for the dis-
tribution and sale of electric current to consumers 
beyond its corp-orate limits, and to own and oper-
ate transmission lines for that purpose along the 
highway or over and upon rights of way acquired, 
is not questioned in this action. G.S. Sec. 160-255. 
But this legislative authority would not be re-
garded as eonferring the right to exclude competi-
tion in the territory served. Having the right to 
engage in this business gives no exclusive fran-
chise, and if fro1n lawful competition its business 
be curtailed, it would seen1 that no actionable 
wrong would result, nor "\Vould it be entitled to 
injunctive relief therefrom. * * * 
"The plaintiff's positon is that if it be con-
ceded that the defendant City of Washington, in 
the operation of an electric power plant for the 
benefit of its citizens, was given authority to ex-
tend its lines and furnish electric service to con-
sumers beyond its corporate limits, nevertheless 
when the defendant in doing so undertook to con-
struct and operate a public service system in 
direct compettiion, by parallel lines, with the pub-
lic service systen1 of the plaintiff already estab-
lished and serving the same territory, it became 
amenable to the regulatory requirement of the 
general statute, G.S. Sec. 62-101, that it must first 
obtain a certificate of public convenience and 
necessity from the Utilities Commission. Plaintiff 
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maintains that considering the purpose of the stat-
utes requiring supervision by the Utilities Com-
mission together with the evils which would result 
from competition in the same locality between two 
public service systems, it was in the legislative 
mind that the same rule should be applied to muni-
cipal corporations as that applied to private cor-
porations rendering public service. 
"The statute relied on by plaintiff as author-
ity for the position that defendant before con-
structing its trans1nission lines outside its limits 
was required to obtain such a certificate reads a.s 
follo,vs: 'No person, or corporation, their lessees, 
trustees, or receivers shall hereafter begin the 
construction or operation of any public utility 
plant or systen1 or acquire ownership or control of, 
either directly or indirectly, without first obtain-
ing from the Utilities Commission a certificate 
that public convenience and necessity requires, or 
will require, such construction, acquisition, or op-
eration: Provided, that this section shall not ap-
ply to new construction in progress on May 27, 
1931, nor to construction into territory contigious 
to that already occupied and not receiving si1nilar 
service from another utility, nor to construction 
in the ordinary conduct of business.' The statute 
designates those upon "\vhom the requirement is 
imposed as 'person, or corporation their lessees, 
trustees or receivers.' These descriptive "\Vords 
are not those ordinarily applicable to, or to be 
thought of as en1bracing cities and towns. And the 
business coming within the regulatory provisions 
of the statute is designated as 'the construction 
or operation of any public utility plant or system.' 
If the Legislature intended this statute to include 
municipal corporations, no distinction was n1ade 
between operations within or without their corpo-
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rate limits. It Vlould not seem to be a reasonable 
co_nstruction of this statute to adopt the view that 
the Legislature intended to prescribe that no city 
or town could operate an electric light plant for 
the serv~ce ~of its citizens without obtaining this 
certificate from the Utilities Commission. Exam-
ining the language of the statute, the implication 
of a private corporation is unmistakable. Limita-
tion upon the granted power of a municipal eorpo-
ration to construct and operate for the public 
benefit an electric distribution syste1n, by requir-
ing such a certificate as a condition p-recedent, 
will not be inferred in the absence of definite ex-
pression of legislative 'viii. 
* * * 
"Giving due consideration to all pertinent 
statutes as well as the decisions of this court, "\Ve 
reach the conclusion that the court below has 
ruled correctly, and that the defendant City of 
Washington was not required to obtain a certifi-
cate of public convenience and necessity fron1 the 
Utilities ·Commission before engaging in the distri-
bution of electric current to consumers outside 
its corporate limits within Beaufort County, and 
that the judgment dismissing plaintiff's action 
should be affirmed." 
City of Phoenix v. Wright, so· P. 2d 390, 52 Ariz. 
227. Application by plaintiff City for 'vrit of prohibition 
to compel plaintiffs as members of the Arizona Corpo-
ration Comn1ission, to desist from atten1pting to assume 
jurisdiction over plaintiff and its municipally owned and 
operated water system in the distribution of water to 
consumers outside its corporate limits. Writ made per-
manent. The court held that the· city had the right to 
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furnish water through its 'vater plant to consumers living 
outside its limits. It is argued that in serving persons 
outside the corporate lin1its the city acts in its proprie-
tary capacity and so is subject to the control of the corpo-
ration com1nission. The court ans,vers this argument 
by pointing out that in the carrying on of its water distri-
bution within its limits it is acting in a proprietary cap-
acity as rnuch as when distributing \Vater outside its 
lin1its. Sec. 8 of Art. 15 of the Constitution provides. 
~~ .:\11 corporations other than municipal en-
gaged in carrying persons or property for hire; 
or in furnishing gas, oil or electricity for light, 
fuel, or po\ver; or in furnishing water for irriga-
tion, fire protection, or other public purposes, 
shall be deented public service corporations." 
T'he court cites J1 enderson r. City of Phoenix, 76 P. 
:2d ;j21, \vhich held the corporation co1nn1ission had no 
jurisdiction over cities engaged in carrying passengers 
for hire. '~rhe court says: 
"Section 2, article 15, supra, by its express 
language, applies to the furnishing of \\'ater for 
any public purpose, in the sa1ne 1nanner and to 
the sa1ne extent as it does to the carrying of pas-
sengers for hire, and we think it follows. that the 
ronstitution, by neces;-~ary implication, forbids the 
regulation by the corporation eonnnission of 
1nunicipal corporations "\vhich furnish water for 
public purposes to the same extent as it does 
1nunicipal corporations which furnish transporta-
tion for hire. The lin1itations placed hy the con-
stitution on the power of the corporation commis-
sion over municipal c-orporations is not predicated 
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upon the place 'vhere they do business, but upon 
the fact that they are municipal corporations. Such 
being the ease, if a municipal corporation may 
lawfully furnish water for public purposes, to 
consumers outside of its boundaries, it is no more 
subject to regulation by the corporation commis-
sion in so doing than it is in the furnishing of 
water to those inside of its boundaries. The ob-
vious spirit and purpose of section 2, article 15, 
supra, is to leave the regulation of municipal cor-
porations, and their acts, where it has always 
been ever since such corporations have existed-
in the hands of the legislative branch of the gov-
ernment-instead of transferring their control to 
another agency created by the constitution. 
"We conclude, therefore, that under the con-
stitution of Arizona, as it now stands, the corpora-
tion commission h·as no jurisdiction to regulate 
the actions of a municipal corporation engaged in 
the service and delivery of "\Vater for public pur-
poses to consun1ers either inside or outside of its 
corporate limits." 
Phoenrix v. K asun1, 97 P. 2d 210, 127 A.L.R., Page 
84. Plaintiff sought to enjoin defendant city fron1 in-
creasing its water rates to custon1ers outside city limits, 
claiming the rates fixed by the ordinance were excessive, 
confiscatory, unreasonable and exorbitant. Defendant 
city filed n1otion to dismiss on the ground court had no 
jurisdictio~1. Trial court overruled motion and issued 
temporary injunction, from which plaintiff appealed. 
Judgment reversed and injunction vacated. The court 
says: 
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"We have previously laid down certain rules 
governing municipal corporations operating pub-
lic utilities, both within and without their corpo-
rate limits. They 1nay be stated as follows: (a) 
a rnunicipal corporation has a right to furnish 
\Vater through its municipal water plant to con-
sumers without, as well as within, its corporate 
li1nits; ('b) \vhile furnishing water in this man-
ner the state corporation comrnission has no juris-
diction to regulate its actions towards consumers, 
vvhether inside or outside of such limits; (c) the 
legislature is the only body \vhich has the right to 
regulate the rates charged by a municipal corpo-
ration operating a public utility, and it has plen-
ary power in that respect except as limited by the 
Constitution; (d) a municipality may not compel 
consumers outside of its corporate limits to pur-
chase water from it, nor can it be compelled to 
furnish such water to non-residents; (e) a muni-
cipality can only dispose of its surplus water out-
side of its corporate limits subject to the prior 
right of its inhabitants in case of shortage. We 
think these propositions are either declared speci-
fically or impliedly by the cases of City of 
Phoenix v. Wright, 52 Ariz. 227, 80 P. 2d 390; 
Crandall v. Town of Safford, 47 Ariz. 402, 56 P. 
2d 660; City of Tucson v. Si1ns, 39 Ariz. 168, 4 P. 
2d 673; 11enderson v. City of Phoenix, 51 Ariz. 
280, 76 P. 2·d 321. 
"But it is contended, adrnitting all of this to 
be true, the courts have the inherent right to de-
terrnine the reasonableness of charges rnade by 
a Inunicipality, so long as it does furnish water 
outside of its limits. rrhis is urged upon the basis 
that the municipality, \vhen it undertakes this, 
is operating a public utility, and that public 
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utilities are always subject to the jurisdiction of 
the courts as to whether their rates are unjust, 
arbitrary, or confiscatory. 
"The distinguishing characteristic of a public 
utility is the devotion of pTivate pTopeTty by the 
owner to such a use that the public generally, or 
at least that part of the public which has been 
served and has accepted the service, has the right 
to demand that such service, so long as it is con-
tinued, shall be conducted with. reasonable effi-
ciency and under proper charges. When private 
property is thus devoted to the public use, certain 
reciprocal rights and duties are raised by iinpli-
cation of law as between the utility and the per-
sons whon1 it serves, and no contract is necessary 
to give then1. Inas1nuch, therefore, as one \vho 
devotes his property to a use in \Yhich the public 
has an interest, in effect grants to the public an 
interest in the use thereof, he must submit to being 
controlled by the public for the co1nmon good to 
the extent of the interest thus created and so long 
as such is continued. Thiunn v. Illinois, 94 US 113, 
24 Led. 77. The right inherent in the public au-
thorities to control the rates to be charged by 
those operating public utilities is based on the 
fact that they o\ve a legal duty to the public to 
furnish certain serYices and can, therefore, be reg-
ula ted hy the public as to the price to be charged 
for such services. It is upon these basic principles 
that the entire superstructure of public regulation 
of public utility corporations is based. 
"But the fact that a business or enterprise 
is, generally speaking, a public utility does not 
u1ake every service perfor1ned or rendered by 
those O\\·ning or operating it a public service, \vith 
its consequent duties and burdens, but they may 
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act in a private capacity as distinguished from 
their public capacity, and in so doing are subject 
to the same rules as any other private person so 
acting. Killam v. Norfolk, etc., R. Co. 122 Va. 541, 
96 SE 506, 6 ALR 701. Since the basis of the regu-
lation is that a duty is owed the public, regard-
less of contract, it follows as a corollary that 
when the duty which arises is based purely on 
contract and not on law, express or implied, the 
situation is governed by the rules applying to 
private contracts in general, notwithstanding that 
one of the parties 1nay be operating a public 
utility. 
'"Was the service \vhich the City of Phoenix 
rendered to plaintiffs and those in like situation 
\vith the1n, based upon contract or law? If it was 
based upon a legal right, regardless of contract, 
by all the decisions the courts may determine 
whether the terms on vvhich he obtains this serv-
ice are reasona;ble or not. On the other hand, if 
his right to receive service is based solely on a 
voluntary contract with the city, then that con-
tract is subject to review by the courts only in the 
same manner as any other private contract, and it 
is not for them to determine, whether its provi-
sions are arbitrary, unreasonable or discrimina-
tory." 
* >)(: * 
"After a careful consideration of all the 
authorities, we are of the opinion that the con-
trolling factors in the present case are that the 
city \vas under no obligation, as a matter of law, 
to furnish any service to the plaintiffs; that the 
relationship between them was purely contractur-
al in its nature, and that such being the case, the 
reasonableness or unreasonableness of the rates 
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fixed :by the contract are not subject to review by 
the eourt. The only right which it has under the 
circumstances is to determine whether the citv 
is complying with the terms of its contract, sine~ 
there is no allegation that there was any fraud 
in its inception." 
City of Englewood v. City of Demer, _____ _ 
Colo ....... , 229 P. 2d 667. 
Englewood sued to enjoin Denver fron1 collecting 
increased water rates from domestic water consu1ners 
in Englewood. The case was dismissed. The Colorado 
constitutional provision is identical in language with 
our Section 29, Article "'VI, except that our provision 
prohibits the delegation of the selection of a capitol 
site, which pTovision is omitted in the Colorado Consti-
tution. The Colorado Statute gives the city power "to 
sup·ply water from their \Vater systems to consmners 
outside of the corporate limits .... and to collect there-
for such charges and upon such conditions and limitations 
as said towns and cities n1ay impose by ordinances." 
Combining Section 10-8-14, 10-8-22 and 10-7-14 of our 
statutes, above quoted, \Ve have the sa1ne provisions as 
Colorado. 
The Colorado Court says : 
"T·he prime purpose, and we n1ay add, the 
only purpose, was to supply water to the residents 
of Denver and the permission granted the Engle-
wood residents by the ordinance, supra to eonnect 
. ' w1th the corporate lines was, and is, \vholly inci-
dental to the 111ain purpose and is strictly a 1nuni-
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cipal affair. While operating its water system, 
and serving \vithin its borders, it could more ap-
propriately be termed a 'munipical utility' rather 
than the broad and all inel usi ve term of 'public 
utility', because within the territorial limits, the 
word 'public' is confined to the citizens of Denver 
and the service is open to all members of the 
Denver public who 1nay require it, and who may 
den1and it within the limits of its capacity to 
serve. It is at once to be seen that the act of sup-
plying water to users beyond the territorial limits 
under the cir'cumstances here does not impress 
the business with a public interest, because the out-
side users in Englewood have no right to demand 
the service." 
The Court then goes on to say: 
'"In the Ina.tter here involved, Denver has 
acted in its proprietary or quasi-private capacity, 
as distinguished from the exercise of government-
al power beyond the municipal boundary. Even if 
the pertinent constitutional provision and statute 
hereinbefore set out were not controlling, this 
proprietary function \vould not bring it within 
the public utility statute, section 3, chapter 137, 
35 C.S.A., the applicable part of which is as fol-
lows: 'Public utility defined * * ')(<. - The ternt 
'public utility', when used in this chapter, includes 
every * * * water corporation, person or muni-
cipality operating for the purpose of supplying 
the public for domestic, mechanical or public uses 
* * *.'It cannot rightfully be contended that Den-
ver in the operation of its water system is operat-
ing for the purpose of supplying Englewood or 
any other part of the public outside of Denver 
with water. In its function of acquiring and sup-
plying Denver residents with water, as a muni-
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cipal function, it is free of the jurisdiction of the 
Public Utilities Commission or any other com-
mission created by the legislature.* * *" 
"We find little need to enter into a lengthy 
discussion of what is or what is not a public util-
ity, beeause we would ultimately apply the almost 
universally accepted test, which summarized is, 
that to fall into th.e class of a public utility, a busi-
ness or enterprise must be impressed with a pub-
lic interest and that those engaged in the conduct 
thereof must hold themselves out as serving or 
ready to serve all members of the public, who 1nay 
require it, to the extent of their capacity. The 
nature of the service must be such that all mem-
bers of the public have an enforceable right to 
demand it. Application of this test to the facts 
before us reveals that this extra-territorial supply 
of water is on a nonutility basis, and in so operat-
ing, under express statutory auth.ority, it can col-
lect such charges therefor and make such condi-
tions and limitations as it may impose, all without 
liability of any vested right for a continued sale 
or leasing thereof. We find, and so determine, 
that Denver holds such water as is not needed 
by it for immediate use in its proprietary capa-
city, in which it has a well defined property right; 
and section 35 of Article \T of the Colorado Con-
stitution, sup-ra, withholds from the legislature 
all power to dedicate to any co1n1nission any super-
vision of this prop·erty right, thus precluding any 
jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission. 
Prior to the enactment of the Utility Commission 
Act, the legislature in 1911 enacted section 22 of 
chapter 163, '35 C.S.A., giving incorporated to,vns 
and cities the right to supply water from their 
water systems to consumers outside of their cor-
porate limits. It is contended by Englewood coun-
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sel that the 1913 Public Utility A:ct repealed this 
law by implication. This argument seems to rest 
on the general theory th.at the subsequent 1913 
Public Utility Act takes precedence over the prior 
enactment. It is the universal rule that repeals 
by implication are not favored. This doctrine 
1nay be invoked \vhere a conflict clearly and un-
avoidably exists. We may rightfully assume that 
the 1913 Public Utility Act \vas passed with full 
knowledge of the existence of the 1911 statute. It 
may further he assumed that the legislature did 
not consider the 1913 act to be on the same sub-
ject as the 1911 Act. If such "'-ras the legislative 
assumption, it was correct. The two Acts are not 
on related subjects and, of course, no repugnancy 
exists. As will be seen, the 1911 Act, supra, had 
only to do with the empowering of incorporated 
municipalities to supply water frorn their systems 
to outside consumers upon such rates and limita-
tions as the municipality might see fit to impose; 
while the 1913 Public Utility Act fixed the control 
of pujblic utilities. We must believe that the legis-
lature was cognizant of the constitutional limita-
. tion placed on the Public Utili ties Commission, 
or any other commission, over rnunicipal corpora-
tions. This limitation is based upon the fact that 
they are municipal corporations. Section 32, Art-
icle V, Colorado Constitution, supra. We there-
fore determine that the two acts are not inconsist-
ent and that the latter Act does not expressly 
or impliedly repeal the former." 
This case was followed in City of Colo. Spriwgs v. 
Public Utiliti.es Co1n., 248 P. 2d 311. 
State ex rel West Side Improvement Club v. Depart-
ment of Public Ser,vice of Washington, 58 P. 2d 350. 
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The City of Brem1nerton owns and operates a water 
system by which it furnishes water for its inhabitants 
and to persons living outside its limit. The club is con1-
posed of outside residents who are users of the citv's 
water. The club filed application with the Department 
of Public Service to hold a hearing and determine the 
price that water users outside the city should pay. The 
department dismissed the application for lack of juris-
diction and this action was brought against the depart. 
ment and its mem'bers. The question is whether the de-
partment has jurisdiction to fix rates to users outside the 
city limits. The court first says: 
"Without specifically referring to the acts 
of the legislature, it appears to be definitely set-
tled that (a) a city owning a water system may 
extend its service to those living outside of its 
corp·orate limits; and (b) that within the corpo-
rate lirnits the city has the right to control the 
price or rate at which the service will be rendered. 
"Inquiry 1nust then be directed as to whether, 
for the service outside of the corporate limits, the 
department of public service or the city has the 
right to fix the rate or price, and this depends 
upon the construction to be given to certain statu-
tory provisions." 
The court goes on to show that in 1911 the legis-
lature enacted the Public Utilities Act. Originally, the 
Act did not authorize the department to fix rates of a 
water system owned by a city or town. In 1917 the 
Legislature for the first time authorized a city to extend 
a water systen1 owned by it to service users outside its 
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corporate limits, but provided that "such portion of such 
public utility that extends beyond the corporate limits of 
any city, shall be operated at such prices and under such 
rules and regulations, as may be prescribed by the Public 
Service Commission." 
In 1933 an Act was passed to the effe'ct that when any 
city or to\vn owning and operating a water system de-
sires to extend such utility beyond its limits it 1nay con-
struct any addition or extension to said system and sell 
\Vater to any co1nn1unity, corporation or person desiring 
to purchase the same and may enter into contracts for 
furnishing \Vater, "fixing the terms upon which such 
outside distribution system will be installed and the rates 
at \vhich and n1anner in which payment shall be made 
for the service rendered." 
There is no express repeal of the 1917 provisions. 
rrhe court held that the 1917 law and the 1933 law were 
repugnant and irreconcilable in that the first give the 
Public Service Commission power to fix prices, while 
the latter gave the city the right to fix prices. The Legis-
lature intended to give the city the sole and exclusive 
jurisdiction over the rates at which it would furnish 
\Vater to outsiders and to take fron1 the deparhnent 
jurisdiction which it previously had had. The \vrit of 
1nandate \Vas denied, even though repeal by implication 
is not favored. 
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The following cases from California, while not di-
rectly in point, are instructive, and tend to bear out de-
fendant city's position liere. 
Pasadena v. Ra.ilroad Co,mmission, 183 Cal. 526, 192 
P25, 10 A.L.R. 1425. Pasadena owned an ele~ctric power 
plant and in 1909 extended its wires to serve the adjoin-
ing city of South Pasadena. In 1919·, on complaint of the 
Pacific Light and Power Company, which also supplies 
power to South Pasadena, the Railroad Co1mnission, 
under the Public lTtilities Act, ordered Pasadena to file 
with the ·Commission a co1nplete schedule of its rates. 
Pasadena brought this action to annul this order, on 
theory that the Public Utilities Act has no application 
to any public service carried on by a municipal corpora-
tion. The powers of the Railroad Commission were de-
rived from Sections 22 and 23 of Article 12 of the Con-
stitution whi~ch state: 
"Every private corporation, and every in-
dividual or association of individuals, owning, 
operating, 1na.naging or controlling any commer-
cial pipeline, plant or equip1nent ... for the pro-
duction, generation, transmission or furnishing 
of heat, light, "\Yater or po,ver to or for the public 
... is hereby declared to be a public utility sub-
ject to su·ch control and regulation by the Rail-
road Commission as 1nay be provided by the 
Legislature." 
The court held this proVIsion had no application 
to a municip~l corporation and annulled the order. The 
court repudiates the argument that a municipal corpora-
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tion in supplying water, light or power to its inh.abitants 
is not acting in its governmental capacity as sovereign 
but is acting in a proprietary capacity, and so must be 
subject to the Utilities Act. 
"It is not true that a city is a private corpora-
tion when carrying on a municipally owned public 
utility." 
Dwrant v. Cvty of Beverly Hills, 102 P. 2d 759. Plain-· 
tiff sued for declaratory relief in relation to the rates 
charged hin1 by defendant for water served to him in an 
unincorporated area outside the city limits, known as 
\\7est Hollywood. l-Ie claimed the right to water at the 
sarne rate as paid by inhabitants of defendan-t city. Plain-
tiff and others had been served by a private utility until 
defendant bought the entire plant and operated it as a 
part of its municipal plant serving water to its inhabi-
tants. The rates fixed by the city, while more than the 
rates charged inhabitants, were less than those previ-
ously charged by the private utility. The court reversed 
judgment for plaintiff, saying: 
""There are certain legal principles applicable 
to the controversy which should be stated at this 
time. 'A grant of power to provide and supply 
water to a city and its inhabitants, authorizes a 
city to carry on a system and supply water to per-
sons outside its limits, whenever it becomes nec-
essary or convenient to do so in order to accom-
plish the main purpose of supplying water to 
those \\'ithin.' South Pasadena v. Pasadena L. & 
W. Co., 152 Cal. 579, 580, 93 P. 490. When neces-
sary for its purposes a n1unicipality 1nay purchase 
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an entire water plant or system so that 'after op-
erating the system and supplying the persons 
entitled to use the water, it could devote the sur-
plus to the use of the inhabitants of the city.' 
Fellows v. Los Angeles, 151 Cal. 52, 64, 90 0. 137, 
141; South Pasadena v. Pasadena L. & W. Co., 
152 Cal. 590, 93 P. 490, sup,ra. In these operations 
the municipality is not selling surplus or excess 
vvaters to the prior users. The purchase of the 
system is impressed vvith a trust and the city, 
'with respect to this part of the water, will hold 
title as a mere trustee, bound to apply it to the 
use of those benficially interested.' Id., 152 Cal. 
at page 594, 93 P. at page 496. The continued 
supplying of water to the outside territory, being 
incidental to the main purpose, is a municipal 
affair. Id., 152 Cal. at page 594, 93 P. 490. 
* * * * 
"The power of the city to fix rates to be 
eharged those custon1ers residing within its bound-
aries is incidental to the power to 'establish and 
operate' public utility systems conferred by sec-
tion 19 of article XI of the Constitution. This 
power to fix the charges for service by the Inuni-
cipality when operating a municipally owned pub-
lic utility is not controlled by section 23 of article 
XII of the Constitution. Citv of Pasadena v. 
Railroad Commission, 183 Cai. 526, 534, 192 P. 
25, 10 A.L.R. 1425; J ochimsen v. Los Angeles, 54 
Cal. Ap·p. 715, 716, 202 P. 902. The power of the 
city to furnish services to inhabitants outside its 
boundaries is a part of the constitutional grant 
found in section 19 of article XI, wherein the city 
is authorized to establish and operate the utility; 
and since the operation of the system in the out-
side territory is but incidental to the main purpose 
of service to the inhabitants of the city, it follows 
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as of course that the municipal authorities enjoy 
the same right to fix the charges to be paid by 
those served in the outside territory as it has to 
fix those charged in its own inhabitants. And, 
upon the ruling of the Pasadena case that these 
extra-territorial operations are the 'municipal 
affair' of the operating city, it follows that the 
city council n1ust, at least in the first instance, 
be held to have the power to fix all rates to be 
charged for its public utility services to those 
\Yithin and without its boundaries." 
Cdy of llfill rrallcy V. Sexton, 106 P. 2d 455. Plain-
tiff sought a \Yrit of rnandate to compel defendant as city 
treasurer to sign certain municipal bonds authorized 
by the electors of the city to issue for the purpose of rais-
ing funds to acquire and operate a municipal transporta-
tion systern bet\veen Mill V ailey and San F'rancisco and 
intern1ediate points. Defendant's refusal was based on 
the theory that the city's funds could not be expended 
for a service \vhich \vould be in part for the benefit of 
non-residents and non-taxpayers. Section 19 of article 
11 of the Constitution authorized n1unicipal corporations 
to establish and operate certain named utilities including 
transportation and authorized furnishing such services 
to inhabitants outside its houndarie~. The court ordered 
the writ be issued, saying: 
"R.espondent relies on Taylor v. Dimmitt, 336 
Mo. 330, 78 S.W. 2d 841, 98 A.L.R. 995, and Dyer 
v. Newport, 123 Ky. 203, 94 S.W. 25; holding that 
a eity could not construct \Vorks beyond its bound-
nries to supply public utility service to nonresi-
dents consun1ers. We are not impressed \vith the 
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applicability of those cases in view of our consti-
tutional grant of power, nor with the reasoning 
of the opinions generally. If a city is endowed 
with the power to sell excess utility service, the 
means of performance whereby the service can be 
made and supplied are necessarily implied 1n 
the grant of power to sell. 
* * * * 
"The respondent attacks the installation of 
the system on the grounds that it would require 
the taxpayers of the city to support the transpor-
tation system not only for its own inhabitants but 
also for those of the traveling public outside its 
boundaries. This it is said might be a gift of 
public funds for private purposes and hence con-
trary to the p·rovisions of article IV, section 31, 
of the Constitution. Conlin v. Board of Super-
visors, 99 Cal. 17, 33 P. 753, 21 L.R.A. 4 7 4, 37 
Am. St. Rep. 17, and Goodall v. Brite, 11 Cal. App. 
2d 540, 54 P~ 2d 510, are cited in support of the 
argument. Neither :case is in point. They involved 
instances of direct gifts of public funds for pri-
vate purposes. Here we have a case where public 
service is exchanged for a compensation and it 
will not be assu.med that the city will misuse the 
power by giving the transportation free. On the 
con;trary, it will be presumed tha.t the city will ex-
ercise the p,ower fairly atnd in accordance with 
the p~trposes of the statutes. That nonta:xpayers 
living outside the boundaries of the city may thus 
obtain an advantage at the risk of the taxpayers 
within the city is no more serious obstacle to the 
validity of the scheme than that nontaxpayers 
living within the city limits may enjoy the same 
advantage. But, if this feature of the general 
s:cheme is objectio~able on the ground stated, it 
goes to the entire plan of public utility service 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
47 
both within and without the municipal boundaries. 
If the plan is economically unsound for this rea-
son, the objections raised are administrative and 
legislative, rather than judicial. We have here 
to consider only that the constitution and the 
statutes h·ave conferred the power upon the eity 
and the wisdom of the legislation is not a matter 
for us to decide." 
Plaintiffs n1ake the assertion that the City in selling 
\Vater outside its boundaries departs fron1 its municipal 
functions of governing its inhabitants. No authority 
is cited for such assertion. We submit on the contrary 
that in the disposition of its surplus water outside its 
boundaries the city still continues to act as a govern-
n1ental unit, still performs a proper 1nunicipal function 
to the sa1ne extent and in the same manner as it does in 
the disposition of its water within its boundaries. The 
case of Ml~P~r v. Murray City, supra, unquestionably sup-
ports that proposition. Sec. 10-8-14 must be taken as a 
grant of municipal po\ver and function, both in the au-
thorization of the acquisition of waterworks and in the 
sale of surplus water. The case of Pasadena v. R.R. Com., 
supra, expressly states that a city is not a private corpo-
ration, when carrying on a n1unicipally owned public 
utility. 
Notwithstanding that Sec. 54-2-1 states that the term 
corporation includes a municipal corporation, the court 
in Loga,n City v. Public Utilities Com., supra, held that 
cities were not subject to the provisions of the Public 
Utilities Act as to the sale and disposition of electric 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
48 
energy generated by a municipally owned and op~erated 
plant. To hold otherwise would he to violate the provi-
sions of the constitution \Vhich gives a city exelusiYe 
jurisdiction over its property and effects. That reason 
applies equally to surplus energy as to energy consumed 
by inhabitants. Plaintiffs are forced to take the position 
that the Public Service Commission should have control 
over the sale of surplus water to non-residents in order 
to protect them in their water supply. We ask how is the 
Public Service Co1nn1ission going to protect non-residents 
to assure then1 a water supply~ By giving them a vested 
interest in the city's water supply~ By con1pelling the 
city to furnish water regardless of the city's needs~ 
Surely, the com1nission has no means or po,ver to provide 
some kind of auxiliary supply of water for such con-
sumers. If these consumers are to be assured of a per-
petual supply of "rater from the city's \Vater supply, by 
and thru the Public Service Con1mission assuming con-
trol over that water supply, what becomes of the consti-
tutional provisions of Sec. 6, Art. XI which prohibits 
the sale or other disposition of any part of the. city's. 
waterworks, water rights or sources of supply~ Can the 
Legislature ignore that provision and create a situation 
such that any city which attempts to sell its surplus 
water automatically avoids the constitutional prohibi-
tion~ The right granted to sell surplus water outside its 
li1nits cannot beco1ne the 1neans by which a city avoids 
the ·constitutional inhibition and loses for its inhabitants 
some of its water supply. The imaginary evils which 
plaintiffs envision in a city being left uncontrolled by the 
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Public Service Commission in the disposition of its sur-
plus 'vaters is not any justification for abandoning the 
constitutional provisions referred to. Furthermore, no 
city, including defendant city, can undertake any exten-
sive sale of water outside its limits. It can only tempo-
rarily dispose of, by contract, such water as it might 
not presently need for its inhabitants. This does not pre-
sent any situation frought \vith evils. The city can give 
no perpetual right to receive 'vater. Its surplus must al-
ways be very much limited in quantity and n1ust always 
be subject to the prior rights of the inhabitants of the 
city. The sale of surplus water is 1nerely incidental to 
the n1ain purpose of supplying water to the city's inhabi-
tants. In the face of such undisputable conditions the 
specter of a gigantic octupus, reaching out its limitless 
tenacles in every direction to str'angle and destroy others 
selling 'vater, fades as an imaginary night 1nare resorted 
to only to distort the real issues. In this connection it 
should be remen1bered that this is a suit to declare rights, 
not to enjoin unlawful acts. 
Neither in their petition nor in their brief have plain-
tiffs correctly quoted Sec. 5-J-2-1 U.C.A. 1953, defining 
a public utility. The actual language is as follows: 
~·The term ~public utility', includes every 
co1nmon carrier, gas corporation, electric corpora-
tion, telephone corporation, telegraph corporation, 
7,i'ater corporation, heat corporation and ware-
housemen where the service i,s performed. for, or 
the comn~odi,ty delivered to, the zntblic' generally." 
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Then follows the language: 
"And whenever any ... water corporation 
... p·erforms a service for or delivers a co1nmodity 
to the public for which any compensation or pay-
ment whatsoever is received, such ... water cor~ 
poration . . . is hereby declared to be a public 
utility, subject to the jurisdiction and regulation 
of the commission and the provisions of this title." 
s.uch definition clearly indicates that "to fall into 
the class of a public utility, a business or enterprise must 
be impressed with a public interest and that those en-
gaged in the conduct thereof must hold themselves out as 
serving or ready to serve all members of the public who 
may require it, to the extent of their capacity. The na-
ture of the service must be such that all members of the 
public have an enforceable right to demand it." City 
of Englewood v. City & County of Denver, supra. 
The definition that plaintiffs have omitted is the 
first sentence of Sec. 54-2-1, aibove quoted, which requires 
a delivery of service to the "public generally." The next 
sentence uses the words "perfonns a service for or de-
livers a commodity to the public, which must be synony-
mous with the previous language to the "public gen-
erally." Not only have plaintiffs misquoted the defini-
tion of a public utility, as above p·ointed out, but they 
have omitted to quote or refer to Subsection 26 of Sec. 
54-2-1, which defines a 'vater corporation as including 
"every corporation and person ... owning, controlling, 
operating or n1anaging any water system for public serv-
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ice 'vithin this state." This again emphasizes the essen-
tial elen1ent that the systen1 1nust be for the public 
generally, the service must be a public service. Corpora-
tions delivering water to their own stockholders are ex-
pressly excluded. The definition is restrictive; it ex-
cludes all corporations and persons not coming within its 
express language. As held by the Englewood case, it 
cannot rightly be contended that Salt Lake City in oper-
ating its water system is operating it for the purpose of 
supplying water to any part of the public outside its 
limits. It is not operating in any sense as a public utility. 
It is engaged in supplying water to its residents as a 
1nunicipal function under power granted it by the Legis-
lature 'vith the right, also granted by the legislature, to 
dispose of its surplus water by contract to those of its 
O\Vn selection and upon terms satisfactory to it, and with-
out anyone having any vested right to demand such 
\Vater. The city is not engaged in delivering water to 
the ((public generally" from its present system. It 
couldn't if it \vanted to as its present syste1n is held and 
must be used for its inhabitants. A different situation 
would 'be involved where it acquired and held a water 
system, not for its own inhabitants, but for the purpose 
of supplying persons outside its limits with water. So 
long as the city is only attempting to dispose, by contract, 
of \Vater resulting as a surplus over that required by its 
jnhabitants, it follows that the basis of the right of regu-
lation by the Public Service Commission is absent, since 
the basis of that right is "that a duty is owed the public, 
regardless of contract," and "it follows as a corollary 
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that 'vlien the duty "\Vhich arises is based purely on con-
tract and not on la\v, express or implied, the situation is 
governed by the rules applying to private contracts in 
general." City of Phoenix v. Kasum, supra. 
Counsel brush aside the case of City of Phoenix v. 
Wright, supra, with the statement that because the Con-
stitution of Arizona excluded municipal corporations 
from being regulated by the corporation commission that 
case has no control here. We ask what difference is there 
between such an exclusion by express language and the 
exclusion made by this court in construing pertinent pro-
visions in our Constitution bringing about the same re-
sults~ Counsel concede our Constitution inhibits the Com-
mission from jurisdiction over the distribution of water 
within the city, but argue that it has jurisdiction as to 
distri'bution of water outside the city. Would not such 
an argument be equally applicable if the Constitution con-
tained the exemption as in the Arizona case~ The fact is, 
such argument was 1nade in the Arizona case and re-
jected, with the statement that the constitutional liinit-
ation upon the ·Co'lnmission is not predicated upon the 
place where the cities do business, but up·on the fact that 
they are n1unicipal corporations. "Such being the ease, 
if a municipal corp·oration 1nay lavvfully furnish water 
for public purposes to constuners outside its boundaries, 
it is no more subject to regulation by the corporation in 
so doing than it is in furnishing 'vater to those inside 
its. boundaries." 
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Counsel dispose of City of Phoenix v. Kasu,m,, supra, 
·with the san1e superficial conclusions. The discussion 
in that case as to what constitutes a public utility is ig-
nored. It was expressly held that where the consumer 
cannot de1nand a product as a matter of right, there can 
be no public utility relationship. It is purely contractual. 
That is exactly the situation between Salt Lake City and 
persons desiring service outside its limits. Without 
further discussion we refer the court to the Arizona case 
as quoted herein. 
As to the case of Atlantic Canst. Co. v. City of Ral-
eigh, supra, counsel simply say that the statutes of North 
Carolina gave the city jurisdiction over its sewage system 
hoth \Yithin and without the city. And counsel states that 
Tou:n of CriJneslG!Jird v. City of Wash., 66 S.E. 2d 794, 
is of the same import. The sa1ne explanation is given of 
vV a.ter W arks Boa.rd of City of Mobile v. City of Mobile, 
supra. Section 10-8-2 of our statute provides that cities 
1nay purchase and hold property, real and personal, for 
the benefit of 'the city both within and without its corpo-
rate boundaries. Section 10-7-14 says that the City may 
enact ordinances, rules and regulations for the manage-
Inent and conduct of the water vv-orks system owned or 
controlled by it. Section 10-8-22 gives the city the power 
to fix the rates to be paid for water furnished by the 
city. vVe ask, do not these statutes expressly give the city 
jurisdiction of its water works wherever the saine 1nay 
be? Doe:-; not Section 10-8-14 expressly give the right 
to sell water outside the corporate limits~ Wherein then 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
54 
is the supposed distinction between these two North 
Carolina cases and the case at bar~ The fact is there is 
none and no attempt is made by counsel to distinguish the 
third and latest North Carolina case, Filligham v. Town 
of Selma) supra. Other cases -cited by the city are like-
wise not referred to by plaintiffs. 
Curiously enough counsel present not a single de-
cision of the courts of last resort in support of their posi-
tion. All citations are to Public Service ·Commission rul-
ings. Furthermore, it does not appear from counsel's 
quotations that the statutes and constitutional provisions 
there involved are at all similar to ours. 
POINT FOUR 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO 
FIND THAT THE DEFENDANT PUBLIC SERVICE COM-
MISSION OF UTAH HAS AUTHORITY AND THAT IT IS 
ITS DUTY TO REGULATE THE SALE AND DISTRIBUTION 
OF WATER WHICH IS DISPOSED OF BY THE DEFEND-
ANT SALT LAKE CITY OUTSIDE OF ITS CORPORATE 
LIMITS. 
What has heretofore been said herein on the other 
points is applicable to Point Four so far as defendant 
Salt Lake City is concerned. We feel we have demon-
strated that the petition fails to state a claim against 
the city upon which relief can be granted. That ends the 
matter so far as the city is concerned; and it like\vise 
ends the matter so far as all the other defendants are 
concerned, including the public service commission. If, 
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as \Ve have shown, the city is not subject to the Public 
Utilities .... \.ct in disposing of its surplus water, then de-
fendant Public Service Commission eould not be required 
to assu1ne jurisdiction and no relief could be given to 
plaintiff as against that defendant. 
\Vhether the petition is fatally defective because 
plaintiffs have not exhausted their administrative remedy 
by a proceeding before the Public Service Commission 
before co1nn1encing this action is a question which we will 
leave to that defendant to argue. 
CONCLUSION 
\Ve sub1nit that there is no uncertainty as to the 
provisions of either Section 10-8-14 or the Sections of 
the Public Utilities Act relied on by plaintiffs. It is also 
clear that the City may lawfully dispose of its surplus 
"\Vater outside its limits. It may dispose of the same on 
a contractual basis without creating any vested interest 
therein in anyone contracting to purchase the same. It 
may construct such pipelines and facilities as may be 
necessary to make delivery of this surplus water. In 
the disposition of its surplus water it cannot, by the very 
nature of things, stand in the classification of a public 
utility; it can only stand in the position of a government-
al unit disposing of a surplus as an incident to the fur-
nishing of water to its inhabitants. Since it is not sell-
ing water to the public generally, since it may not so 
dispose of its surplus water as to give any one a right 
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to demand \Vater, and to insist upon a perpetual delivery 
of water, it is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Pub-
lic S-ervice Commission. All this appearing as, a matter 
of law from plaintiffs' petition it fails to state facts 
which would entitle plaintiffs to any relief and the judg-
ment of dismissal would be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CHRISTENSEN, 
City Attorney 
HOMER HOLMGREN and 
WAYNE CHRISTOFFERSEN 
Assistant City Attorneys 
Attorneys for Defendant and Respondent 
Salt Lake City 
414 City & County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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